De la compensación a la emulación: un análisis realista neoclásico de las estrategias de contrapeso interno de Rusia
Resumen
En 2008, Rusia comenzó a implementar su reforma militar más grande desde la creación del Ejército Rojo en 1918. Los intentos anteriores, en 1992, 1997 y 2003, no lograron transformaciones fundamentales en sus fuerzas armadas. ¿Por qué la reforma militar de 2008 tuvo éxito y otras no? Este artículo utiliza el método histórico comparativo para identificar los mecanismos causales entre el nivel de amenaza externa de Rusia, su nivel de capacidad estatal y sus estrategias de contrapeso interno adoptadas desde 1991. Además, este análisis avanza las variables sistémicas y unitarias del realismo neoclásico, basándose en las contribuciones de los estudios estratégicos y la sociología histórica, en detrimento de otras teorías de las Relaciones Internacionales. En síntesis, el éxito de las reformas militares en Rusia, en el período posterior a la Guerra Fría, depende de la existencia simultánea de tres condiciones: la posibilidad de perturbar la estabilidad estratégica, la capacidad del Estado ruso de extraer y movilizar recursos sociales, y la existencia de algún evento de ineficacia probada. En escenarios en que solo una o dos de estas condiciones están presentes, los rusos llevaron a cabo solo reformas parciales. Finalmente, el artículo arroja luz sobre tres impulsores de la reforma militar de Rusia, a menudo descuidados por analistas occidentales: su continuo énfasis en la competencia interestatal, la estabilidad estratégica y la guerra convencional de media y alta intensidad.
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